Buchanan [The Economics and the Ethics of Constitutional Order, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, pp. 159-178; The Returns to Increasing Returns, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, pp. 331-342] proposes an interesting hypothesis explaining the prevalence of an ethic encouraging more work. Economies of specialization mean that more division of labour may increase productivity. If everyone works more, this increases the extent of the market which enables higher degree of division of labour and hence higher productivity. Individual choice between leisure and work thus results in a sub-optimal level of work. One way to counteract this is to maintain a work ethic. This paper examines the validity and significance of this hypothesis in the Yang-Ng framework of inframarginal analysis. Buchanan's thesis probably has more relevance in ancient times when the work ethics originated but is less significant in the current world of global trade where the billions of individuals involved is sufficient to sustain specialization without artificial encouragement of additional work effort. On the contrary, the competition for relative standing, the materialistic bias caused by our accumulation instinct and advertising, and the environmental disruption of material production and consumption suggest that the discouragement of long working week may be more conducive to welfare.
Introduction
proposes an interesting hypothesis explaining the prevalence of an ethic encouraging more work. The economies of specialization means that more division of labour may increase productivity. If everyone works more, this increases the extent of the market which enables higher degree of division of labour and hence higher productivity. Individual choice between leisure and work thus results in a sub-optimal level of work. One way to counteract this is to maintain a work ethic. This paper examines the validity and significance of this hypothesis.
Economists have not paid much attention to this and similar problems partly, if not mainly, because of the preoccupation with the sectoral resource allocation problem of the neoclassical economics instead of the division-of-labour problem of the classical economics. Yang and Ng (1993) attempts to shift the attention back to specialization, using formal models of optimization and equilibrium to analyze the classical problem of division of labour. It is interesting to see the significance of Buchanan's hypothesis in this new framework.
Even within the traditional framework, the problem of increasing returns has not been completely ignored. A well-known analysis is the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) model of monopolistic competition. Within the monopolistic competition sector, each firm produces a product with decreasing average costs (a positive fixed cost plus a constant marginal cost). The rest of the economy is lumped into a composite good. To analyze the problem of work ethics, we may regard this composite good as leisure. There is nothing in the model to preclude such an interpretation. We may then directly apply the Dixit-Stiglitz result to assess the validity of Buchanan's hypothesis within such a model. Dixit and Stiglitz compare the market equilibrium (with free entry) with both the case of constrained optimum (where each firm must not make a positive loss) and that of unconstrained optimum (where lumpsum subsidies to firms are allowed). Due to the difficulties of lumpsum subsidies in the real world and to Buchanan's emphasis on realistic market economies, the case of constrained optimum is the more relevant one. Dixit and Stiglitz's 'results undermine the validity of the folklore of excess capacity, from the point of view of the unconstrained optimum as well as the constrained one . . . with a constant intrasector elasticity of substitution, the market equilibrium coincides with the constrained optimum . . . . It is not possible to have a general result concerning the relative magnitudes of [leisure] ' (Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977, pp. 301-302) . In other words, even if the unconstrained optimum is feasible, it may involve more or less leisure than the cases of the free market equilibrium and constrained optimum. This is in contrast to Buchanan's hypothesis on the presumption of over-consumption of leisure. However, this need not be a fatal blow to Buchanan who has in mind not so much the traditional economies of scale but the classical economies of specialization from the division of labour which is better modeled by the Yang-Ng framework. So, we shall mainly examine the Buchanan hypothesis on work ethics in this latter framework. To do so in an intuitively more obvious way of graphical presentation, we first discuss the consumption constraint (partly for its own interest) faced by an individual in the Yang-Ng framework in the next section, before examining the issue of work ethics in Section 3. In fact, Buchanan and Yoon (1994) provide a model with the result of over-consumption of leisure. The higher productivity of a larger market size comes from a larger supportable number of intermediate goods, which is assumed to increase productivity (the Romer assumption). In our paper here, we show the possibility without using this mechanism. The Appendix A examines the problem more formally, providing some support to the Buchanan thesis. However, the concluding section discusses some offsetting considerations. Briefly, Buchanan's thesis probably had more relevance in ancient times when the work ethics originated but is less significant in the current world of global trade where the billions of individuals involved is sufficient to sustain specialization without artificial encouragement of additional work effort. On the contrary, the competition for relative standing, the materialistic bias caused by our accumulation instinct and advertising, and the environmental disruption of material production and consumption suggest that the discouragement of long working week may be more welfare conducive.
Specialization and consumption constraints
In the traditional framework discussed in all economics textbooks, the consumption constraint faced by an individual/household who can buy at given prices is linear. In the case of Robinson Crusoe, it coincides with the production possibility curve which is concave (the production set is convex). In the Yang-Ng's framework, the production set is non-convex both for the case of Robinson Crusoe and for the case of a multi-person economy. Due to the economies of specialization, the production set is as depicted in Fig. 1a and b, respectively for the cases of a single person and two persons.
In the single person case, obviously, the consumption constraint coincides with the production set. For the case of zero transactions costs with an infinite number of individuals offering unlimited trading possibilities (unlimited in the sense of eliminating the integer problem of finding a willing partner to exchange goods each specializes in, not in the sense of the absence of constraints on the price ratio), the picture is also simple and similar to the traditional case. The individual will be able to trade at the given equilibrium price ratio and hence face a linear consumption constraint. For the case of individuals with similar production abilities/functions, they all have the same production set and hence the equilibrium price-ratio is determined by the (absolute) slope of the line y 1 x 1 in Fig. 2 , since a different price-ratio will be unable to induce any individual to produce one of the goods. Neither the similarity in preferences between individuals nor the symmetry in preferences between the goods is needed for this result. For simplicity and without loss of generality, normalize the units of the goods such that the value of each good that can be produced by one person is equal in Figs. 1a and 2 , x 1 = y 1 . At the equilibrium price-ratio of the line in Her production point is either at x 1 or y 1 depending on whether she produces X or Y. We have here the complete division of labour (each person produces no more than one good) with free exchange unfettered by the integer problem due to a large number of individuals relative to the number of goods.
The introduction of transactions costs makes the consumption constraint different from the line x 1 y 1 . For simplicity, consider the case of a proportional transactions cost (i.e. the ice-block effect, with a constant percentage of the good bought from the market melted before consumption; as a larger block of ice will have a smaller percentage melted, the ice-block is not a perfect example of this case of proportional transactions costs). If the transactions costs are small relative to the degree of economies of specialization such that it is always more efficient to specialize in the production of one good, the situation is as depicted in Fig. 2a where the consumption constraint becomes x 1 Py 1 . If the highest indifference curve is reached along the segment x 1 P, the individual produces at x 1 and exchange up from x 1 along x 1 S, but with the proportionate transactions cost reducing the consumption point to the segment x 1 P (with transactions costs, it is not efficient for a producer of X to exchange beyond this point S; if an individual prefers to consume more of good Y than the point P, she should produce y instead of x, and vice versa for the producer of Y with respect to the point R). On the other hand, if the transactions cost is large relative to the degree of economies of specialization, the consumption possibility set is Ox 1 AEFBy 1 in Fig. 2b . The individual may produce at either x 1 or y 1 ; other points on his PPC are inefficient except possibly the segment EF. The cases of fixed transactions costs, combined transactions costs, etc. may be similarly analyzed.
For the case where the number of individuals are not large relative to the number of goods, the situation is quite different and much more complicated. As a simple example, consider the case of two individuals (Arthur and Betty) with two goods (X and Y). Assuming similar production possibilities, their aggregate production set is as depicted in Fig. 1b . But what is the consumption constraint of each? First, each individual always has the autarky alternative to fall back on. Hence, the consumption possibility set cannot be smaller than the production set of autarky (i.e. the shaded area Ox 1 y 1 in Fig. 1a) . It is well known that, in the case of bilateral bargaining situation, the outcome is indeterminate and depends on the bargaining skills of the persons involved. So, let us abstract away this aspect of the problem by assuming that the two persons are similar in bargaining skills (or both insist on some form of fairness) or by assuming a Nash bargaining outcome. The two individuals will reach an outcome that is sort of equally advantageous to both (hence, effectively also eliminating the possibility of a stalemate). The situation remains complicated.
If we further assume that the two individuals have identical preferences and that transactions costs are zero, the consumption possibility set faced by each person is Ox 1 Qy 1 , i.e. the aggregate production set divided by two, as shown in Fig. 3 . For example, the point P on the consumption constraint is reached with one person producing at x 1 and the other producing at P", reaching the aggregate production point P whose equal division gives the point P. Alternatively viewed, the person producing at x 1 exchange Tx 1 amount of X for PT amount of Y (hence, we may note that, unlike the case of many individuals, here the equilibrium exchange ratio is dependent on preferences, even under the assumption of similar preferences and equal bargaining skills. In Yang and Ng, 1993 , the simplifying assumption of symmetry in preferences between goods ensures that point Q instead of any other point in the consumption constraint is selected).
Note that points on the line x 1 Qy 1 , except the three points x 1 , Q, and y 1 , that are feasible in the case of Fig. 2 (with many individuals and with zero transactions costs) are no longer feasible in this case of Fig. 3 (with only two individuals and identical preferences) and hence not drawn. For example, if Arthur prefers a point like R to Q and wants to produce at x 1 and exchanges up x 1 Q to reach R, this is possible only if Betty produces at y 1 and exchanges to reach S. However, with the usual convexity of preferences, if R is preferred to Q, Q is preferred to S and hence, a fortiori, R is preferred to S. With our assumption of equal bargaining skill and similar preferences, Betty will not agree to settle at S, with Arthur reaching a much superior position R. Of course, if S is still superior to all point in the autarky production set and if Arthur is better in bargaining than Betty, then R may be feasible. This illustrates the dependence of the feasible consumption set on bargaining. And of course, the introduction of transactions costs further complicates the identification of the consumption set, as we discussed for the case of many individuals illustrated in Fig. 2 . However, instead of discussing this complication, we move to the introduction of leisure.
For simplicity, Yang and Ng (1993) does not consider leisure as a variable. In the new classical framework, leisure has been considered by Lio (1996) . In our graphical approach here, leisure necessitates an additional axis as illustrated in Fig. 4 for the case of an infinite number of individuals with no transactions costs. The introduction of leisure allows the question of work ethics to be analyzed, as done in the next section.
Does the economy of specialization make work ethics welfare-improving?
It may first be noted that, in the case of an infinite number of individuals and in the absence of ignorance, irrationality, tax distortion, and external effects (on which see below), the artificial encouragement of work ethics cannot increase, but will likely decrease, welfare, ignoring possibly some freak second-best and/or distributional effects. In this case, the advantage of specialization can be fully realized without artificial encouragement of work ethics (in the absence of significant transactions costs whose presence complicates the graphical illustration without affecting the conclusion). Each individual reaches her highest indifference surface by her rational choice depending on her true preference between leisure and goods. In Fig. 4 , suppose point A touches the highest indifference surface and the individual chooses to have OL amount of leisure. The artificial encouragement (including through work ethics) to work more may make the individual chooses a point like B and a smaller amount of leisure OL'. However, evaluated at her undistorted preference, she is better off at A than at B. This is so despite the fact that her labour productivity is higher at B (with the production point at either x 1 or y 1 ) than at A (with the production point at either x 1 or y 1 ) due to the economies of specialization. True, 10% more work may produce 15% more product. However, if the individual prefers the consumption point A to B, it is better to have lower productivity and more leisure. Thus, the study by Lio (1996) which addresses the question of productivity but not the question of preference or welfare, while yielding some interesting results, does not answer the question regarding the desirability of encouraging work.
On the other hand, in the case of a small number of individuals, it is not difficult to construct examples to show that a decrease in the preference for leisure (higher level of work ethics) by an individual may benefit others through more opportunities for trade and specialization. This effect is similar to the network externality. However, this extra-trade effect is present even in the absence of the economies of specialization. This is illustrated in Fig. 5 for the simple case of two individuals with exogenous comparative and absolute advantage, constant returns to scale, linear transformation curve (between good X and good Y; i.e. constant marginal rate of transformation, but a diminishing MRT may also be allowed) and absence of transactions costs. Arthur has a comparative advantage in producing X; spending PR amount of time working, his production possibility curve for the two goods is indicated by the line x 1 y 1 , in contrast to that of x 2 y 2 for Betty. Arthur would like to sell X for Y if the price of X in terms of Y is larger than 1/2. However, if Betty prefers to have 24 h of leisure a day, choosing the corner solution at P even if she is offered two units of X for each unit of Y, Arthur is stuck with his production possibility set. On the other hand, if a higher level of work ethics makes Betty willing to spend PQ amount of time working to produce at y 2 and exchange (drawn as one to one, but could be more favourable) to reach the point A, this will allow Arthur to reach B which may be preferable to all points on his production set. Thus, Arthur is made better off by Betty's higher level of work ethics due to the increased opportunity for exchange. While goods are tradable, leisure is not. (The possibility of joint usage of leisure and/or the externality in leisure is not considered here.) Betty's preference for the corner solution at P may be regarded as rather extreme. However, even at less extreme choice, Betty's strong preference for leisure may still leaves Arthur with little opportunity to trade, such as being able to move up from x 1 only a very small distance, instead of to point B or beyond. That the opportunity for trade of an individual is increased by the lower preference for leisure is shown more formally in the appendix which allows for different degrees of economies of specialization and shows that the higher the degree of economies of specialization, the larger is the beneficial effect of a higher work ethics on the trading partner.
However, the gain of Arthur from the higher work ethics of Betty is at the expense of the latter. In terms of her intrinsic preference (her preference unaffected by the work ethics), Betty must be worst off at the point A (rationality and the absence of ignorance are assumed here, for relaxation of these, see section 4). Otherwise, Betty could be persuaded by Arthur to produce at y 2 and trade to and consume at A, even without the artificial work ethics.
It may be noted that the case for the work ethics on the ground of economies of specialization should be based on the evaluation in accordance with the original preferences. For example, the case for taxing pollution is justified on the ground that individuals will be better off with the tax according to the given preferences, though each individual on her own prefers to pollute. If the case for the work ethics were based on some irrationality of preferences, then the evaluation might be made with respect to certain more rational preferences if such could be justified. Since the case is not based on some problem with the original preferences but purely on the economies of specialization, one must be able to show that, due to the working of these economies, some artificially higher level of work ethics may yet lead to a superior situation even according to the original preferences. If one could base the case on the new preferences, one could argue for changing the preference for x over y into y over x for any x and y at all. However, it is true that, since economic analysis is based on a given set of preferences, when preferences change, especially if exogenously, economists have really no widely accepted criteria to judge desirability. Nevertheless, I have argued elsewhere (Ng, 2000) that happiness should then be used as a valid cross-preference criterion since happiness is our ultimate objective and that remains unchanged as preferences change. However, the case for the work ethics does not pretend to be based on a higher happiness level even if the resulting situation is lower in terms of the original preference. Thus, we need not be concerned with this issue here.
A question arises: does Arthur gain more than marginally at only a marginal loss to Betty? If so, the artificial encouragement of the work ethics may still be desirable from a social point of view. The answer is negative. At the exchange ratio of one-to-one illustrated in Fig. 5 , it is true that the gain to Arthur may be larger than marginal even only for a small amount of exchange undertaken. It is also possible for the loss in intrinsic preference to Betty to be only marginal. However, if this is the case, Arthur should be able to persuade Betty to undertake some production plus some exchange at a more favourable ratio to Betty such that the whole change is Pareto optimal according to the intrinsic preferences of both individuals. The fact that this is not possible and an artificial work ethics is needed means that, if the change is more than marginally beneficial to Arthur, it must also be more than marginally detrimental to Betty according to the intrinsic preferences.
While the economy of specialization is not necessary to make work ethics possibly welfare-improving for others due to higher trading opportunity, it should increase this welfare-improving effect as it increases the gain from specialization and trade. In this sense, the Buchanan thesis on work ethics has some validity. However, its quantitative significance is unlikely to be large. This is so since there are millions of individuals in the real world and the costs of long distance trade are decreasing due to improved transportation and communication. Hence, in the real world, we are more characterized by the case of Fig. 4 than by that of Fig. 5 , or the generalization of Fig. 5 to cover the presence of economies of specialization.
While the network or trading externality may exist for the case of a small number of individuals (in either the presence or absence of the economy of specialization, as shown above), it need not always exist even for the case of just two individuals. This is shown in Fig. 6 for the case of two identical (in productivity, preference, and bargaining skills) individuals with the presence of economies of specialization (Fig. 6 is the extension of the case of Fig. 3 to include leisure as a variable). Suppose that the consumption feasibility set (only shown partially in Fig. 6 ) touches the highest indifference surface (in accordance to the intrinsic preference) at A. The artificial encouragement of work ethics shifts the solution to B. Similar to the case of Fig. 4 , this shift is again a deterioration according to the intrinsic preference. The expanded extent of the market does not help in this case (Fig. 6) as the economy of specialization has already been fully utilized at the original point A where each individual specializes in the production of only one good. Even if there are more goods than individuals such that each individual has to produce more than one good, a higher degree of specialization can be better facilitated by a larger number of individuals than by a longer working week. Moreover, the globalization of the economy means that we have billions of individuals, a number well in excess of the number of goods.
Concluding remarks
From the discussion above and that of the appendix, it may be concluded that, while the Buchanan idea of the beneficial effect of work ethics through its facilitation of division of labour to benefit from the economies of specialization has some validity, its significance is small in the present world of global trade at relatively small transportation and other transactions costs. Nevertheless, in ancient times when the work ethics originated, the Buchanan thesis might have had more relevance. Before the development of modern mass transportation and convenient communications, most of the trade typically was confined to relatively small geographical areas with small population sizes. The opportunity for trade would thus be significantly increased through a higher work ethics. The gain from a higher degree of specialization may thus offset the loss of artificial encouragement of work. Of course, the work ethics might also have been fostered by factors unrelated to this paper. For example, the presence of a small proportion of people too lazy to work and preyed or relied on others might have caused sufficient external costs to generate forces promoting the work ethics.
In the contemporary world, while such factors such as laziness may still be as important, there are offsetting considerations which may tilt the balance the other way round. Particularly, three factors may be mentioned here. First, beyond the biological levels of survival and comfort, higher consumption has largely relative than absolute significance. This has been emphasized by economists from Rae (1834) and Veblen (1929) to Akerlof (1976) , Ireland (1998), and Frank (1999) , among others. Recent studies reveal the magnitude, scope, and relative (to absolute income) importance of relative standing that are beyond the imagination of most people, ourselves included. For example, one may expect that the importance of relative standing is least in the area of health care where the absolute effects may be expected to dominate. However, Wilkinson (1997) shows that even in health care, relative standing is more important than absolute standards. The relatively poor, even with higher absolute incomes and health care, ended up with much lower level of healthiness than the absolutely poor but relatively well-off. Mortality is more a function of relative than absolute income and health care. The competition in relative terms, especially in income and consumption, leads to excessive amount of work from the social point of view. This at least partly explains why we need limitations on working hours rather than encouraging more work.
Secondly, in addition to the relative-income effect, our accumulation instinct and the omnipresent advertising in our commercial world cause a materialistic bias, making individuals placing more emphasis on making money than warranted by its real contribution to welfare, even from the individual point of view, as argued in Ng (2000) . Thirdly, the production and consumption of most goods and services, directly and indirectly (through input usage, for example), causes significant degree of environmental disruption. The largely global public-good nature and very long-term nature of most environmental protection measures also cause them to be under-provided by national governments with relatively short time horizons. Income-earning work is related to production and consumption and leisure as such is less environmentally disruptive. (Tourist activities that are environmentally disruptive are more money-intensive than leisure-intensive.) Thus, the consideration of environmental protection also points to the discouragement rather than the encouragement of work.
Appendix A
In this appendix, we use a simple model of the Yang-Ng framework allowing the inframarginal comparison of different corner solutions of organizational choice (such as autarky versus division of labour) to examine the role of different degrees of preference for leisure.
For simplicity, non-labour inputs are ignored. Each individual has T units of time which may be used for leisure or the production of either or both of the only two goods X and Y. Thus, each individual is faced with the time constraint:
where l is the leisure time, l x and l y are the time used in the production of X and Y, respectively. The production functions are
where a > 1 would indicates the presence of economies of specialization. Individuals are taken as ex-anti identical and production functions are symmetrical to emphasize the point that gain from trade may arise from the economies of specialization alone. A Cobb-Douglas utility function is used for simplicity. Since we are considering a change in preference only for leisure, we let only leisure to carry a preference variable. Those for x and y (using lower case to indicate the amount consumed) may be normalized to unity by scaling the utility function since no asymmetrical preference between the two goods has to be introduced.
Consider first the case of autarky where the individual self-produces both goods. The utility function may then be written as
The maximization of Eq. (4) with respect to the choice of l y gives the solution
Now consider the case of specialization where an individual produces only one of the goods and exchange with another individual who produces the other good. Due to symmetry, we need only to consider the case where the individual produces X. From his output of X, he supply x s in exchange for y at a price of p (price of X in terms of Y). However, market transactions is supposed to incur a transactions cost of 1 − k. Thus, while the amount of Y he bought is equal to px s , the amount he actually consumes equals only kpx s . His utility function may thus be written as
The maximization of Eq. (6) with respect to l and x s gives the following solution:
From Eqs. (6) and (7), we have
where the superscripts D and A stand for division of labour and autarky, respectively. In this symmetrical model, for the case of either a large number of individuals (or price-taking behaviour), two individuals with equal bargaining ability, or with the Nash bargaining outcome, we have p = 1. Then, division of labour yields a higher utility if and only if 2 2(a−1) k > 1, i.e. if the economies of specialization (measured by a − 1) is sufficiently large to offset the effect of transactions costs (measured by 1 − k). For example, if a = 1.1, k has to be no smaller than 0.87055 for division of labour to dominate autarky in this simple model. It may be noted that, in this model, the relative superiority of division of labour versus autarky does not depend on the preference for leisure. However, if division of labour is chosen, then the willingness to trade decreases with higher preference for leisure; x s is a decreasing function of α. Thus, to the extent that other people may benefit from one's willingness to trade, a higher degree of work ethics (reduced preference for leisure) may be regarded as favourable. This may be shown more formally by bringing in the other person who produces Y into the picture. His situation is exactly the same as the person producing X depicted above, except that his preference parameter for leisure is indicated by β. Then his supply y s is the same as the second equation in (7) for x s except that α is replaced by β. Then, from the market equilibrium requirement px s = y s (since the price of Y in terms of X is the inverse of the price of X in terms of Y), we may solve for the equilibrium price of X in terms of Y as
which clearly increases with α and decreases with β. Thus, the person producing X benefits from the higher work ethics of the person producing Y and vice versa. Now, let us examine the effect of a higher degree of the economies of specialization (a larger a) on the benefits of the higher work ethics of others. To concentrate on the increase in work effort rather than the complication of an initial interpersonal difference in preferences for leisure, we evaluate the effect of an increase in a on the effect of a change in α (or β, the two are symmetrical) on p at an initial position when α = β (it may be noted that it is more convenient to examine the effect on others through the exchange ratio rather than on utility itself. The effect of a simultaneous change in both α and β on utility is dependent on the normalization with respect to α, β, and T. This is related to the non-arbitrariness in the choice of units discussed in Ng and Wang, 1995 . Moreover, with a change in preference, it also raises the question of using which preference pattern to make welfare assessment). We then have
This means that, the higher the degree of economies of specialization, the larger is the beneficial effect of a higher work ethics on the trading partner. Thus, to this extent at least, Buchanan's conjecture has validity and is related to the economies of specialization.
